Conditions of Possibility: Jameson, Žižek and the Persistence of the Dialectic by Flisfeder, Matthew
 Socialist Studies: the Journal of the Society for Socialist Studies 6(1) Spring 2010:162-168 
Copyright © 2010 The Author(s) 
 
www.socialiststudies.com 
ISSN 1918-2821 
 
 
REVIEW ESSAY 
 
Conditions of Possibility 
Jameson, Žižek and the Persistence of the Dialectic 
 
MATTHEW FLISFEDER  
Ryerson University & York University  
 
Fredric Jameson. 2009. Valences of the Dialectic. London and New 
 York: Verso. ISBN 978-1-85984-877-7. Cloth: 62.50 CAD. Pages: 
 625. 
 
Slavoj Žižek. 2009. First as Tragedy, Then as Farce. London and New 
 York: Verso. ISBN 978-1-84467-428-2. Paperback: 16.00 CAD. 
 Pages: 157. 
 
Many contemporary cultural and social theorists, like Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri, deny the importance of the dialectic for critical theory and 
socialist studies. The two provocative books reviewed here take the 
opposite position.  
 Valences is a collection of previously published articles, with the 
exception of the new first and last chapters, centring on the topic of the 
dialectic in cultural and political theory.  In the introductory chapter, 
Jameson argues that dogmatism and empiricism, which he describes as 
‘ideologies of everyday life’ are ‘natural enemies’ of dialectical thinking, 
since both emphasize timelessness and filter out contradiction. In contrast, 
dialectical thinking is interested in how ideas or concepts change and 
transform, so challenging all conceptions of stasis and certainty. Further, 
Jameson claims that the contradiction between dialectic and non-
dialectical thought is itself dialectical and that, moreover, any attempt to 
resolve this contradiction bares the influence of non-dialectical thought. 
Jameson deals with this dilemma by ‘deconstructing’ each side of the 
alternative. It is through this breakdown of the problem that he comes to 
divide the dialectic into three ‘forms’: ‘The Dialectic’, ‘a dialectic’ and ‘the 
dialectical’. 
 Jameson identifies ‘The Dialectic’ as a philosophical system in 
Marxism. Dialectical materialism is the philosophical form of Marxism, 
referred to in the West as orthodox or vulgar Marxism and often 
misleadingly associated with Stalinism. The various western Marxisms 
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distinguished themselves from dialectical materialism (i.e., Stalinism) by a 
turn to ‘historical materialism.’ In both cases, however, Marxism is turned 
into a system. 
 In contrast to this view of Marxism and of ‘The Dialectic’ as a system, 
Jameson asserts the importance of theory. Theory ‘is to be grasped as the 
perpetual and impossible attempt to dereify the language of thought and to 
preempt all the systems and ideologies which inevitably result from the 
establishment of this or that fixed terminology’ (9). Like psychoanalysis, 
Marxism is a unity-of-theory-and-practice, which sets out how systemic 
closures may be transcended. The concepts developed in the unity-of-
theory-and-practice are always specific to the situation and cannot, 
therefore, ‘be completed by philosophy but only by practice’ (11). This 
unity-of-theory-and-practice stays true to the dialectical movement which 
inscribes temporality into the situation: the way things appear ‘now’ may 
appear differently in the movement of practice, which ‘resets the 
coordinates’ of the possible. Dialectical thinking allows us to perceive a 
condition of possibility out of a condition of impossibility, and it is praxis 
which extracts the former from the latter. From a strictly dialectical 
perspective, we can assess historical inevitability only after the fact – 
hence, dialectics are the politics of the possible. 
 Jameson further argues that ‘The Dialectic’ indicates group 
affiliation, acting as an equivalent to the term ‘Marxism’: both function to 
group people together as ‘Marxists’, in the same way that avoiding such 
terms is a way of taking political distance from such affiliations. Using the 
term may suggest a cult-like religious identification with Marxism. Failing 
to do so may mean rejecting not ‘just’ the language but also the political 
possibilities it represents. Thus, Jameson proposes a third solution: to use a 
language ‘whose inner logic is precisely the suspension of the name and 
the holding open of the place for possibility’ (12). For Jameson, this is the 
language of Utopia. Dialectical utopian language avoids concepts like 
‘radical democracy’ that have the potential to be appropriated in 
manipulative ways by the ruling ideology, a danger shared with any non-
dialectical concept. At the same time, a dialectical approach to utopian 
language means considering terms other than Marxism and ‘The Dialectic’, 
while remaining conscious of the risk that going beyond such terms will 
simultaneously mean losing their originality and radical implications. 
 After this exploration of ‘The Dialectic’, Jameson considers 
dialectics as an indefinite article – ‘a dialectic’ – finding a plurality of ‘local’ 
dialectics. In contrast to ‘The Dialectic,’ local dialectics are better 
understood as abstract patterns without unity, thus avoiding the 
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philosophical or ideological presuppositions of dogmatic thinking that 
colour ‘The Dialectic’ as a philosophical system.  In this section, Jameson 
makes a significant assertion regarding the traditional understanding of 
the dialectic as a movement from thesis to anti-thesis to synthesis. He 
argues that any position can be the starting point of a dialectic which then 
moves by way of an encounter with its negative. However, the final 
moment is not some unity between the two prior moments – the immature 
reference to synthesis: it is rather an obliteration of the opposition itself – 
the moment of Aufhebung, or ‘sublation,’ in Hegel. Class struggle, for 
example, can only be eliminated by the sublation of ‘class’ into some new 
concept. Another example Jameson invokes comes from Lukács, for whom 
‘realism’ is the missing term in the opposition between symbolism and 
naturalism in literature. In both cases, the ‘bad opposites’ are identified by 
way of a shared flaw which is not a ‘synthesis’ in the popular conception of 
dialectics, but the invention of a new term that dissolves the negative 
opposition. The negative terms share nothing until we add the third term. 
This element of ‘mediation’ demonstrates the way in which dialectics 
transforms negativity into positivity or a condition of impossibility into a 
one of possibility. 
  In the last version of dialectic – ‘dialectical’ – Jameson considers the 
‘dialectical’ as a method, via comparison between Adorno and Žižek. In his 
view, these two are the most brilliant dialecticians in the history of 
philosophy. Adorno’s ‘negative dialectics’ is not a separate species of 
dialectics but part of a paradox whose ultimate consequence is that it is no 
longer be possible to say or do anything at all; in this, ‘negative dialectics’ 
and ‘deconstruction’ resemble each other. Adorno is correctly suspicious of 
all non-dialectical positive statements, including Englightenment ideals, 
fearing that any such statements ultimately become fixed, atemporal 
masking ideologies. For example, ‘modernist’ art, which sought to free 
itself from the strictures of the classical artistic tradition, became an 
equally rigid set of rules that had to be followed. Yet, if Jameson urges us to 
share Adorno’s suspicion of ‘positivities’, he nonetheless suggests that we 
must go beyond it -- following Adorno’s purely negative dialectic only 
reinforces the politically defeatist ‘cynical reason’ of the present moment. 
 Against the political paralysis a purely negative dialectic implies, 
Jameson prefers Žižek’s dialectic, with its possibilities of the Absolute. 
Žižek rejects the crude Hegelian tripartite: thesis – anti-thesis – synthesis, 
but retains a tripartite movement. This is the movement from: 1) stupid 
first impression; to, 2) ingenious correction in the name of some 
underlying reality or ‘essence’; to, 3) a return to the reality of the 
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appearance in the first impression. It was the appearance which was true 
after all, echoing the Hegelian thesis that the ‘supersensible is appearance 
qua appearance’: what we first assume is an appearance masking some 
essence (the reality behind the illusion), turns out to conceal the essence of 
appearance itself (the reality in illusion). There is no essence behind 
appearance; it is the appearance itself which makes it seem as though 
something is being hidden. We come to discover that the truth is in the 
appearance after all, and not in some non-existent ‘essence.’ At the end of 
the process we come back to the same place, but with a new perspective. 
This is precisely the method that Jameson follows in his thinking on the 
dialectic. In the end we come back to the stupid first impression of ‘The 
Dialectic’ and the tension between system and method. But for Jameson, it 
is as a unity-of-theory-and-practice that this return to the stupid first 
impression of the dialectic allows us to continue working within its 
parameters. 
 Žižek’s new book, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce repeats Marx’s 
famous opening remarks in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: 
‘Hegel remarks somewhere that all great world-historic facts and 
personages appear, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as 
tragedy, the second time as farce.’ Žižek uses these lines to comment on the 
bookends of the first decade of the twenty-first century. The decade, Žižek 
notes, began with the tragedy of the September 11th, 2001, attacks on the 
World Trade Centre in New York City, and ended with the farce of the 
economic credit crisis. Both, he claims, assert an end to the Fukuyamaist 
‘happy 90s,’ the supposed ‘end of history’ and the beginning of the new era 
of capitalist globalization. The first implied an end to the supposed reign of 
liberal democracy in politics, and the second signalled an end to the 
flourishing neoliberal economy. 
 The book begins with typical Žižekian observations on everything 
from the financial crisis, to contemporary fundamentalist-radicalism, and 
the politics in the Middle East. Žižek continues a line of argument from his 
previous book, In Defense of Lost Causes (Verso, 2008), wherein he argues 
not for some kind of objective analysis, but rather, for an engaged, partial, 
subjective analysis of Truth. In this latest book, he claims that to 
understand crises it is important to assume an engaged subjective position. 
In fact, it is in the antagonism between subject positions that we find the 
kernel of the class struggle, today. For example, regarding the financial 
crisis, so long as we remain within the capitalist order, there is a degree of 
truth in the claim that the middle and lower classes will prosper so long as 
Wall Street remains intact: ‘kicking at Wall Street really will hit ordinary 
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workers’ (15). A proletarian class position is required to see through this 
ideological mystification. 
 The farce of the crises, for Žižek, is not so much that they occurred. 
The farce has much more to do with the inability of the Left to propose any 
alternative during the ruling order’s time of weakness. Žižek suggests that 
we reverse Marx’s thesis eleven on Feurbach, which in the original 
formulation reads: ‘the philosophers have only thought about the world, 
the point is to change it’. On the contrary, Žižek argues that the Left’s task 
today is to start thinking about how to effectively change the world rather 
than continuing to ineffectively act out with a kind of pseudo-activity 
which, for Žižek, amounts to doing everything so that nothing will really 
change. 
 A major contribution of the book is Žižek’s return to the idea of 
communism. Žižek suggests that we ask, not whether or not the communist 
idea is still pertinent today, or whether or not there is still anything useful 
in it. Rather, we should ask how our contemporary problems appear from 
the perspective of the communist idea. With this, Žižek seems to oscillate 
between ‘communism’ as a regulative idea – something for which he 
criticizes Badiou (about which more below) – and as a practical solution to 
contemporary antagonisms. It might be worth noting that the term 
‘communism,’ for Žižek, seems to have the same function as that of the 
party for Lenin, or realism for Lukács: it is a positive term which mediates 
the opposing negativities in the contradiction. 
Badiou argues that the ‘communist hypothesis’ is an eternal ideal, 
an Idea to be re-invented in each new era (Badiou, 2009). Žižek rejects this 
approach, warning against the idea of the ‘communist hypothesis’ as a 
Kantian ‘regulative ideal.’ Instead, Žižek emphasizes the importance of 
understanding the ‘communist hypothesis’ in real, material terms. 
‘Communism,’ he claims, is not an Ideal, but a movement – a claim that 
seems to contradict the presuppositions in the opening pages. To this end, 
he notes four particular antagonisms within the existing capitalist order 
which are strong enough to prevent the indefinite reproduction of capital: 
the threat of ecological crisis; the inappropriateness of the notion of 
private property in the domain of ‘intellectual property’; the social and 
ethical implications in technological and scientific developments, 
particularly in biogenetics; and, newly emerging forms of apartheid and 
the erection of walls and slums that divide populations between the 
‘included’ and ‘excluded.’ 
 Yet, Žižek notes that there is a qualitative difference between the 
first three antagonisms and the final antagonism between the included and 
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excluded. The first three are all examples of dynamics around what Hardt 
and Negri refer to as the ‘commons,’ and it is these which, according to 
Žižek justifies interest in ‘communism’.  Yet, the enclosures of intellectual 
property, nature, technology and science, are structured along the lines of 
inclusion and exclusion, which continues various processes of 
proletarianization, so that the first three antagonisms explain the fourth, 
overdetermining factor. But is this notion of the proletarianized excluded 
the same as the revolutionary subject for Žižek? 
 For Žižek, this movement still needs organization among the three 
fractions of the ‘working class’ to become a truly revolutionary subject. 
Part of the problem stems from the increasing global division of labour – 
or, more precisely, among labourers. The labour process is increasingly 
split and separated (sometimes by entire continents) between intellectual, 
planning, and managing labour; the labour of material production; and, the 
provision of material resources (often by way of enclosures, thus creating 
walls and slums for the excluded). Each of these spheres of production 
relates to three different fractions of the working class: intellectual 
labourers, manual labourers (the ‘old’ working class), and the ‘outcasts’ 
(the unemployed, slum dwellers, as well as those living in the ‘interstices of 
public space,’ as Žižek puts it). 
 Each working class fraction has their own ways of life and ideology: 
the intellectual ‘class’ participates in an enlightened hedonism and liberal 
multiculturalism; the traditional working class engages in populist-
fundamentalism; and, then there are the extreme lifestyles of the outcasts. 
The fact that these fractions (not ‘classes’ in the sociological sense) of the 
‘working class’ never come into contact with each other speaks to the 
increasing separation between people in ‘public space.’ Postmodern 
society is marked by this increasing separation of people from each other 
in spaces of everyday life, so that the division between these three 
fractions, separated by negativities and difference, appears to result from 
different forms of spatial partitioning. 
  ‘Identity politics’ has come to fill in the gap left by the 
disintegration of social life and public space. However, identity politics 
assumes a different meaning in each fraction: multiculturalism for the 
intellectual ‘class’; populist fundamentalism for the ‘working class’; and, 
‘semi-illegal groupings,’ such as gangs and religious sects, for the outcasts. 
Moreover, each fraction ‘play(s) off of each other’: the intellectual class 
harbours cultural prejudices against the so-called ‘redneck,’ often racist 
and sexist, working class; the working class harbours a populist ‘hatred’ 
towards the intellectuals and outcasts; and, the outcasts are ‘antagonistic 
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to society as such.’ In these conditions, the need for the proletarians of the 
world to unite is more pertinent than ever. So much so that, as Žižek 
contends, their unity is already their victory. 
 In his analyses of the commons and the contemporary, post-
industrial, division of labour, Žižek practices the form of dialectical 
thinking Jameson proposes, starting from ‘the stupid first impression’ of 
the division between the ‘classes’ and then returning to their unity as the 
solution to the conflict. The other three antagonisms cannot be solved 
apart from this working class unity and will only ‘wither away’ with the 
resolution of the conflict between the included and the excluded.  
 As readers, however, we must ask ourselves: is ‘communism’ still 
the term which proposes the solution? Has the meaning of ‘communism’ 
been so transformed by the events of the twentieth century that it can no 
longer function as the name for the solution to the class struggle? Or, does 
it still open up a certain space for the transformation of existing conditions 
of domination and exploitation? Is the language of ‘Utopia,’ as Jameson 
suggests, a better alternative? This is the question that must occupy the 
efforts of the Left today: the re-invention of The Dialectic is central to the 
re-invention of politics. 
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